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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the risk management strategies
currently in use by institutional real estate investors. The
argument is made that given the current data constraints,
and the evolving theory, one strategy for investors with
limited portfolios is to explicitly address its management
of specific risk in a portfolio context. This method is
supplemented with a traditional diversification strategy for
market and product-type selections. To support this
argument, the thesis presents the portfolio management
strategy being used at Perini Investment Properties, a real
estate investment firm with a portfolio of properties
currently valued in excess of $300 million. Perini's
decision history with this matrix will be reviewed, in an
attempt to determine its strengths and weaknesses as a tool
for diversification of real estate portfolios.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
Institutional involvement in real estate has changed the
rules of the investment game. These investors have
stimulated a great deal of interest in the area of risk
management. To date, most of the research has focused on
strategies that look to diversify risk, in a portfolio
context, across property-type and location. While this
approach can be quite effective, its sophistication makes it
most appropriate for very large portfolios. Investors with
limited portfolios need a simplified approach that can be
used to balance a portfolio's risk across types of specific
risk. The asset management functions performed by real
estate investors offer an opportunity for simplified
specific risk management. This thesis attempts to provide
investors with a tool to exploit this opportunity.
Overview:
Institutional investment in real estate has been on the
upswing over the last two decades. Spurred on by The
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974,
pension fund investors have helped to lead the way. One
estimate puts pension funds' real estate investment at
$113.4 billion, which would represent a 5% allocation of
total pension reserves to real estate.[16] Prior to the
recent real estate market downturn, the prevailing view was
that pension fund investors would increase their asset
allocation in real estate to 10%, which would mean another
$100 billion of domestic equity capital introduced into the
national real estate market over the next five years. The
current market conditions make this scenario unlikely.
However, as total reserves continue to grow, pension funds
are likely to add to their current real estate investments,
in order to maintain the existing 5% allocation.
Initially real estate investors viewed the market
fundamentals in real estate to be quite different from the
stock and bond markets. The investment focus was on
individual transactions: a deal-oriented approach. Early
attempts at diversification within real estate portfolios
resulted in acquisitions in various geographic regions.
This naive strategy was challenged with the onset of the
troubled times in the oil industry. According to James
DeLisle, research director at Equitable Real Estate
Investment Management, "Most funds were diversified across
regions that turned out to have the same economic base.
They ended up with a bias in their portfolios toward energy.
They also got over-concentrated in office buildings."[12]
As real estate portfolio returns dropped into single digits,
investors began to recognize the need for a more deliberate
approach to building real estate portfolios.
To date, attention has focused mostly on improving the
quantitative foundation for methods of diversification by
region and by product type. Large scale investors who have
been able to use their internal historical return data to
perform statistical analysis have generated some
sophisticated strategies for diversification, primarily
across product type and geographic location. Smaller scale
investors, however, often lack the internal resources to
implement this approach successfully. In light of the
limited data available for statistical analysis, reliance
solely on region and product diversification techniques may
not be appropriate for many investors.
Adding to the need for alternative diversification tools
are two issues relating to the theoretical foundation
underpinning the statistical methods mentioned above. First,
it is not clear that real estate investment occurs in an
efficient market, where information and transaction costs
are negligible, and the market fully exploits all
information. Second, even if an efficient markets
assumption is made, it is a questionable practice to use
statistical relationships derived from historical data to
predict future market behavior. A further complication
arises when one realizes that unlike stocks and bonds, an
investor who purchases a basket of real estate properties
must then provide asset management for those properties
(Figure 1.1). Unlike security investors, the real estate
investor must provide for the management of the forces of
specific risk; a service provided to the security investor
by corporate management.
FIGURE 1.1 - Asset Specific Management Structures
Investor Real Estate Stocks
Inputs: o Basket of Properties o Basket of Stocks
o Asset Management
Result: o Specific Risk o Specific Risk
Diversification Diversification
o Systematic Risk o Systematic Risk
Exposure Exposure
The aim of this thesis is to provide investors with
another tool for risk management, to supplement individual
deal analysis and product and regional diversification. This
tool is a matrix for ranking risk levels by property across
specific risk variables (capital exposure, operating risk,
leasing risk, market risk, and appreciation risk). The
matrix may be the most appropriate risk management strategy
for all but the largest investors, until such time as the
data availability and market efficiency issues are
addressed. Attending to these risk factors in a portfolio
context, the matrix allows an investor to balance risk
across variables so as to minimize portfolio exposure to a
particular event or structural change that might effect
investment returns independent of location or product type.
organization:
This thesis is divided into five parts. The first part
provides an overview of the real estate investment industry
and real estate portfolio management. The next section
reviews the history of Modern Portfolio Theory. It traces
the history of MPT from the securities markets to its
current application to real estate investment. Risk and
return variables in real estate investment are identified
and discussed. The third section examines real estate
product and regional diversification in more detail. The
forth section introduces a method for managing risk by
dealing with its components explicitly, the specific risk
matrix. An overall investment strategy is developed using
individual deal analysis, product-type and regional
diversification, and specific risk diversification. The
strategy suggested is to use product-type and regional
diversification to target acquisitions and sales, and to use
specific risk diversification to confirm the targets and to
inform the deal structures (i.e. leases, debt, etc.). This
strategy is not much different than that currently in use by
Perini Investment Properties. Perini's specific risk matrix
decision history is reviewed to assess the effectiveness of
the matrix in practice. The final section presents a
summary statement of the argument developed in the thesis:
that an integrated risk management strategy represents an
improvement over many of the techniques currently in use,
for all but the largest real estate investors.
CHAPTER TWO:
MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND REAL ESTATE
Chapter Summary: Modern Portfolio Theory
grew up in the securities markets, and its
application to real estate is a recent
occurrence. Real estate's risk and return
characteristics and measurement complicate
transfer of the theory to the new market.
As pension fund investors entered the real estate market
in the early 1970's, they brought with them an investment
strategy based upon Modern Portfolio Theory. It was this
theory that was driving the decision to enter the real
estate market, in order to better diversify investments in
the stock and bond markets. Early attempts to apply MPT to
real estate met with difficulty in two ways. First, the
pre-existing base of real estate investors was set in its
own way of doing things - opportunistic investment on a deal
by deal basis. Second, real estate did not trade in an
auction market as did stocks and bonds. The consequence of
this was that transaction data was hard to come by. Even
when it could be obtained, the heterogeneous nature of real
estate assets made it unclear how the data could be applied.
Assume we knew that two office buildings in Boston sold six
months apart, the first for $200/sf and the second for
$350/sf. It is not clear whether this price differential
resulted from office property appreciation or from
differences in the leaseholds between the two properties.
In order to understand the problems involved in applying
Modern Portfolio Theory to real estate, we begin with an
historic overview of MPT, and later discuss real estate's
unique characteristics.
In the context of Modern Portfolio Theory, return is
defined as the "dividend" yield plus the capital
appreciation, with both terms expressed as a percentage of
the value of the investment at the beginning of the holding
period. The typical time used as the holding period is one
year. An investment of $100 is made to purchase a bond,
which is held for one year. During that time, the bond pays
a dividend of $9 (9%), and realizes capital appreciation
(from a drop in interest rates) of $4 (4%). The total
return on this investment is 13% per annum.
Risk is defined as the amount of variability in the
returns. Investment risk is often expressed in terms of
standard deviation of annual returns from the mean return
for a particular investment. Assuming that real estate
returns were normally distributed, there would be a 67%
likelihood that the actual return would fall within one
standard deviation of the expected mean return. In the bond
example above, if the mean return was 12% and the standard
deviation 1.0, actual returns between 11% and 13% are
expected 67% of the time. In practice, however, real estate
returns are not normally distributed. They tend to be fat-
tailed, biased upward, reflecting the fact that investors
are risk averse, and must see some upward bias in returns in
order to be motivated to place their capital at risk (Figure
2.1). In the above example, this means that actual returns
will be above 11% more than 83% of the time, and be below
13% less than 83% of the time. Implicit in the use of any
of these statistical approaches is the assumption that
historical risk and returns are predictive of future risk
and returns, at least in the long run.
FIGURE 2.1 - Normal vs. Fat-tailed Distributions
11% 12% 13% 11% 12% 13%
Normal Distribution Fat-tailed Distribution
The first contribution to Modern Portfolio Theory was
made by Markowitz in 1952. He proposed that the value of an
asset was a function of the mean and variance of the
expected return on that asset. A central tenet of
Markowitz's idea was that risk must be considered in the
context of a portfolio. That is, an investor may purchase a
combination of assets inter-related in such a way as to make
the risk on the overall portfolio significantly less than
the risk on any of the individual assets.
To illustrate this point, consider the case of two
companies whose expected earnings vary inversely to one
another. Firm A is a health food store. Firm B is a
butcher shop. Both stores operate in the same isolated
community. In addition both stores' earnings will vary
according to the health conscious whims of the community.
Every time the Medi-Van comes to town to perform cholesterol
tests (once every three or four years), community residents
stop eating meat for a year and eat health food instead. In
years that the Medi-Van comes but does not run tests,
residents eat both meat and health food. In years that the
Medi-Van does not come, residents eat only meat and no
health food.
The expected returns for the two firms under each of
these scenarios is presented below. From the table we can
see that investing in the stock of either firm will bring
significant risk, in terms of variations in returns
realized. At the same time, a portfolio containing 50% of
stock A and 50% of stock B will be effectively riskless.
Under any of the three Medi-Van scenarios, the portfolio
return would be 10%.
Firm A:
Health
Firm B:
Butcher
Portfolio
50% A &
50% B
FIGURE 2.2 - Risk Diversification Example
Scenario Return
Van & Test 20%
Food Van & No Test 10%
No Van 0%
Van & Test 0%
Van & No Test 10%
No Van 20%
Van & Test .5(20%) + .5(0%) = 10%
Van & No Test .5(10%) + .5(10%) = 10%
No Van .5(0%) + .5(20%) = 10%
From the above example we can see that the returns on the
two firms vary inversely. In order to quantify this
covariance between returns on different assets, Markowitz
proposed using correlation coefficients. In our Health Food
and Butcher example, the correlation coefficient between the
two stocks is -1.0. This is an idealized example. In
theory, correlation coefficients can fall between 1.0 and
-1.0. In practice, it is rare to find coefficients that
are significantly below zero.
Extending the notion of diversifiable risk, Markowitz
identified two kinds of risk: systematic and unsystematic.
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Systematic risk is that risk that is endemic to the system;
market risk. Unsystematic risk is asset specific risk.
Examples of systematic risk in the stock market are changes
in interest rates or changes in the condition of the overall
economy. Examples of unsystematic risk (also called
specific risk) in the stock market are the price of crude
oil for oil companies' stocks and the price of silver for
photographic companies' stocks. The point here is that
unsystematic risk can be diversified away in a portfolio
context, while systematic risk cannot be diversified away.
Subsequent additions to Markowitz's ideas lead to the
argument that not only can unsystematic risk be diversified
away, it must be diversified away. All other investors in
the marketplace will recognize the benefits of
diversification and invest accordingly. Anyone who does not
do so is not receiving returns adequate to compensate for
the level of risk incurred. That is, premium returns are
afforded commensurate with the level of systematic risk an
investment incurs. No such compensation is granted for
unsystematic risk. This risk-reward relationship is best
illustrated by the "efficient frontier", that describes the
outer limit achievable by an investment portfolio. A
portfolio that falls below the frontier line can be
diversified to achieve either higher returns for the same
level of risk or lower risk for the same level of returns.
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once a portfolio is on the frontier line, higher returns
cannot be achieved without incurring higher risk. In Figure
2.3, A is an efficient portfolio and B is not. That is, A
and B both yield the same return, but A does this with less
risk, and is therefore a better investment.
FIGURE 2.3 - The Efficient Frontier (E.F.)
Return
(%)
Standard Deviation (%)
For investors in the stock and bond markets, Markowitz's
theory was compelling, but nearly impossible to implement.
The calculation of correlation coefficients across hundreds
of assets proved quite cumbersome. This shortcoming was
addressed by William Sharpe in 1964. Building on
Markowitz's ideas, Sharpe introduced the Capital Asset
Pricing Model. The key argument of CAPM is that the only
variance that matters in a diversified portfolio is the
variance between the returns on an asset and the market.
The covariance of that asset and the market, standardized by
market variance, yields a "beta". Beta is the measure of an
asset's volatility relative to the market, and is actually
the regression slope coefficient of the individual asset
regressed with respect to the market. An asset with a beta
of 1.0 will move exactly in step with the market. An asset
with a beta greater than 1.0 will tend to rise and fall by a
greater percentage than the market. In this way, the high
beta asset is said to have a high level of systematic risk.
Conversely, an asset with a beta that is less than 1.0 will
exhibit more stable returns and is said to have a low level
of systematic risk. In place of Markowitz's Efficient
Frontier, CAPM proposed a Capital Market Line to describe
the outer limit of returns that can be obtained for a given
level of risk. Regression of the Capital Market Line yields
the Securities Market Line (Figure 2.4), which is normalized
for the securities market. The risk measure in this case is
beta. As can be seen below, the expected return on an
investment has two components, the risk free return (RF)I
and the risk premium return (Rs). The risk premium for an
asset is equal to the asset's beta multiplied by the
difference between the market's return (RM) and the risk
free return (RF) . In this way, assets are priced such that:
Rs = RF + Betas (RM - RF) *
FIGURE 2.4 - The Capital and Securities Market Lines
r r
CML SML
EF
Rf Rf
dA 1.0
Capital Market Line (CML) Securities Market Line (SML)
Since its introduction, the Capital Asset Pricing Model
has enjoyed widespread use in the securities markets.
Although the theory's validity has been called into question
over the years, it is still in use in these markets today.
CAPM has not, however, been applied to the real estate
market, until recently. A dearth of historical data, an
unclear market definition, and uncertainty about the
validity of the theory have combined to limit the transfer
of this technique from securities markets to real estate.
Markowitz's principle of risk diversification in a portfolio
context still applies however, and investors have used
Markowitz's correlation coefficients method to direct their
real estate diversification efforts. This subject is
covered in more depth in the next chapter on portfolio
diversification. Before continuing this line of inquiry
however, it is necessary to develop an understanding of the
unique characteristics of real estate that may effect
portfolio diversification. These characteristics are
considered in two groups, real estate return variables and
real estate risk variables.
REAL ESTATE RETURNS
Returns in real estate investment depend primarily on
three factors; net income, appreciation, and tax effects.
The income return component is derived from income on leases
less operating expenses and management fees. on most
properties, the income return is relatively stable from year
to year. In this sense, the value of this component can be
figured much like a bond. Factors that influence this value
include inflation, interest rates, and credit quality
considerations.
Appreciation:
The appreciation component of real estate investment
returns is derived from changes in the market value of the
property from period to period. Since the property does not
actually change hands each period, determination of market
value is estimated by using independent appraisals. This
component of returns tends to be more volatile than the
income, and its fluctuations dominate the property's total
return. Factors that influence the appreciation component
include local supply and demand considerations, capital
market considerations, and bias in the appraisal process.
It has been argued that as long as the appraisal bias is
consistent over time, the net effect on the validity of the
numbers will be negligible. It is important to note,
however, that even if this assertion is true, the appraisal
bias does tend to smooth over market fluctuations, and
therefore describes lower levels of variance (risk) than
actual market conditions would warrant.
Tax Effects:
The tax component of real estate returns is derived
primarily from the depreciation and mortgage interest
deductions permitted by the federal tax code, as well as
special credits to provide incentives for historic
restoration, elderly housing, etc.. Anytime that the tax
code is changed, it may impact the effective return from
real estate. These changes can be direct ones, such as
revising the depreciation schedule, or indirect ones, such
as lowering the overall tax rate. The impact of tax code
changes may be reflected in either the income return, or the
appreciation return, or both.
REAL ESTATE RISK
Risk in real estate investment depends primarily on six
factors, some of which have been mentioned above; inflation,
21
tax effects, investor confidence, financing, leasing, and
market factors. Of these, the first three represent
systematic risks in real estate, while the last three tend
to be unsystematic risks. This is not a hard and fast rule,
however, since the definition of the "market" will influence
the systematic vs. specific risk determination.
Inflation:
The primary source used to develop the following overview
of risk factors in real estate is a 1990 article by Randall
Zisler on Real Estate Portfolio Management.[22] It has long
been felt that real estate represents a hedge against
inflation. Recent studies on the subject support this
assertion, to a certain degree. A 1987 study by Hartzell,
Heckman, and Miles [6] found that "real estate offers a 20%
reduction in inflation risk with a 20% share of real estate
in a portfolio." They went on to suggest that "the ability
of real estate to hedge against inflation has been greater
since 1978 than before." A separate study conducted by
Michael Giliberto [4] in 1989 found that "Real estate was an
effective hedge against high inflation but will not
necessarily hedge all inflation." A 1989 study by Marc
Louargand and Lynne Sagalyn [13] found that supply and
demand imbalance in the local leasing market tends to limit
the extent to which real estate owners can pass inflation
through to tenants. This supply-demand imbalance was found
to be most pervasive for office and retail properties, and
least evident for industrial properties. In light of these
findings, it follows that real estate returns will likely
suffer some degradation as inflation increases. That is,
changes in inflation will effect the real rate of return for
both the income and appreciation.
Tax Effects:
As mentioned above in the discussion on real estate
return variables, tax effects can impact both the income and
appreciation return components. It is important to
recognize that real estate is a marketplace for both tax-
exempt and taxable investors. Nevertheless, changes in the
tax code can effect real estate values for both groups. In
particular, to the extent that tax code changes can
stimulate overbuilding, as was the case in the early 1980's,
the impact of a glut of properties effects the income and
appreciation returns for both tax-exempt and taxable
investors. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, which limited and
eliminated many prior tax incentives, has given rise to some
innovative financial structures designed to allow the tax
burden to be shifted from one investor group to another.
one such technique is the use of refinancing (a non-taxable
event), instead of an outright sale, to extract appreciation
without incurring a tax liability. The use of convertible
mortgages, in particular, allows for a sharing of the value
of the tax deferral by tax-exempt and taxable investors.
Investor Confidence:
Investor confidence in the broader United States
securities markets tends to have a positive effect on real
estate returns. A multi-variate regression run by Russell-
Zisler [22] on FRC data found that as investor confidence
erodes (as measured by the spread between the return on
corporate and U.S. Government Bonds), real estate returns
rise. This provides confirmation of the conventional wisdom
that in times of trouble, investors take flight to hard
assets. Another way to view this effect is as a shift in
the Securities Market Line. That is, as high real rates
obtain, the risk premium increases. This can be seen
graphically in Figure 2.5 below.
FIGURE 2.5 - Securities Market Line Shifts
r SML'
Rm' M SML
Rm,
Rf
1.0 Beta
Financing:
Financial risk has three primary components; interest
rate risk, refinancing risk, and default risk. Even if an
investor owns a property not subject to any debt, shifts in
interest rates will effect the value of the expected income
stream from the property. If interest rates rise, the value
of the expected cash flows is diminished due to the higher
discount rate used to compensate for the higher interest
rates. This reflects the opportunity cost of capital. A
similar argument can be made for a property that is subject
to debt. In this case, however, it is possible that the
existing debt may work to counteract the change in discount
rate. If the debt is fixed-rate, a rise in interest rates
will give the debt some positive value, since it is now at a
below market rate.
Interest rate changes also contribute to refinancing
risk. In the case of a property with a five year term
bullet loan (that will require repayment of a large
outstanding balance at the end of five years), refinancing
at a higher interest rate will reduce the property's net
income. In addition, if market conditions have deteriorated
over the term of the loan, refinancing may result in
recognizing a loss of principal, if the lender determines
that the property experienced negative appreciation.
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Default risk is non-existent in the case of a property
with no debt, and quite high in the case of a property with
100% debt. The greater the debt service burden a property
has to carry, the more likely it is that other risk
variables may cause the property to realize a period of
negative cash flow.
Leasing:
Leasing risk has four components; re-leasing risk, tenant
default risk, interest rate risk, and inflation risk. Re-
leasing risk increases as average lease maturity decreases
and as the number of near-term lease expirations increases.
The potential impact of this risk on property value will
depend on market conditions. A healthy leasing environment,
where market rents are higher than contract rents for the
property, will allow a high level of leasing risk to exist
without degrading property values.
Tenant default risk is the risk that a tenant will not
fulfill its obligations under the lease contract. This in
turn depends mostly on the regional and national economic
climate and the credit quality of the tenants. Here again,
the broader market conditions can effect the extent to which
high default risk will impact a property's value. As the
probability increases that a replacement tenant can be found
to pay the same or higher rent as the defaulted tenant, the
impact of impending default on the property value decreases.
Interest rate risk relates to the interaction of several
factors; inflation, lease characteristics, and market
conditions. Neglecting influence from these three factors,
as interest rates rise, the value of the lease contract
income stream decreases, as it must be discounted at a
higher rate. Shifts in nominal interest rates are usually
accompanied by shifts in the inflation rate. Leases are
often written to pass-through increases in operating
expenses, in order to maintain a constant level of net
income. Even when this pass-through provision is present,
however, the constant level of net income is eroded by the
effects of inflation. Beyond this, market conditions will
dictate to what degree pass-through provisions can be
included in leases, and what payment is extracted by the
tenants for the provision.
For the discussion in this section, the market, as it
relates to market risk, is defined to be a local geographic
area (i.e. Boston metropolitan area). Market risk is
closely tied to many of the other factors listed above. The
level of market risk depends on the level of economic growth
in a region together with supply and demand balance in that
region's leasing market. As supply exceeds demand and/or
economic growth becomes negative, market risk increases.
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Poor market conditions have the greatest effect on
appreciation returns. These conditions can also impact
income returns by increasing vacancy rates, increasing
rental concessions (free rent, high tenant fit up
allowances, reduced inflation pass-through provisions,
etc.), and increasing uncertainty.
In the next chapter the Modern Portfolio Theory concepts
are applied to some of the unique characteristics of real
estate that have been outlined above. The focus of the
chapter will be on techniques currently in use that look to
diversify risk in a portfolio context across property type
and location. As these methods continue to develop, their
effectiveness increases. However, the increasing
sophistication of the techniques make them most appropriate
for very large portfolios. Chapter Four presents a
simplified approach that can be used by portfolios of any
size to balance a portfolio's risk across types of specific
risk. This method is particularly appropriate for all but
the largest portfolios. It is not resource intensive, and
attempts to more fully exploit the asset management
functions already performed by real estate investors.
CHAPTER THREE:
PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION & SYSTEMATIC RISK
Chapter Summary: Many institutional
investors in real estate have employed
strategies to diversify away two easily
identified specific risks; product-type and
location. over time these strategies have
become more refined. The strategies that are
currently in place are more sophisticated and
effective than those used a decade ago. A
major problem that still plagues strategy
formation and implementation is the limited
data available on real estate.
The Real Estate Market:
In order to classify real estate risks as being
systematic or unsystematic, a clear definition of the market
boundary is required. To investors in the stock, bond, and
real estate markets, the relevant market boundary for
diversification is one that includes all of these markets.
In this sense, the individual asset categories (i.e. real
estate, stocks, and bonds) in the overall portfolio would
not need to be fully diversified within that category. That
is, the portfolios of these investors could use stock market
assets to diversify risk factors that are either systematic
or specific to the real estate markets. In contrast, the
best that an investor with only one asset category can do is
to diversify a portion of the multi-asset specific risk.
From this investor's perspective, the remaining portion of
the multi-asset specific risk appears to be systematic risk
within the single asset category. MPT suggests that this
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single asset category investor has not optimized his
risk/return relationship until he expands his portfolio to
include allocations in other asset categories. The logical
extension of this argument is that investment portfolios
should include all asset categories in all locations,
globally. While this may be a valid theoretical construct,
most institutional investors restrict their activities to a
few select asset categories, that only recently have
expanded to include real estate.
The argument for a more discreet market definition is
strengthened by the fact that most investment managers
specialize in particular markets. The consequence of this
specialization is that a portfolio that crosses asset
classes is treated as though it were separate portfolios
invested in each asset class. An initial asset allocation
decision is made to invest a certain percentage of the
portfolio in each asset class. The portion of funds
allocated to real estate is then invested in ignorance of
the remaining funds. It follows from this discussion that
the most appropriate definition of a market boundary, for
use in the following pages, would not extend beyond the real
estate market. It should be understood that employing this
market boundary specification neglects opportunities for
improving diversification further in the overall investment
portfolio by explicitly addressing relationships across
asset categories.
For the purposes of this paper, the real estate market is
defined to be equity interest in real assets (land and
improvements), of institutional quality (as defined below),
within the United States domestic market. The justification
for this definition is that this is the market that most
institutional real estate investors limit themselves to.
Debt instruments are not considered explicitly, although the
arguments made in general for equity interests could be
extended to include debt once the different risk/reward
structure inherent in debt is corrected for. Real assets
include land and all building product types (apartments,
hotels, offices, industrial). The institutional quality
requirement is a bit fuzzy in that it can shift over time,
according to institutional preferences (i.e. junk bonds from
1970-1990). In the market today, institutional quality is
primarily expressed as a minimum asset value of $3-4
million. Single family homes for rental are definitely not
institutional quality investments. The restriction to the
United States domestic market is again derived from
institutional preferences. The current interest in
international real estate investment may warrant an
extension of the domestic boundary sometime in the future.
For now, however, the domestic market is most appropriate
given the scope of this paper.
Systematic and Specific Risks:
Working with this understanding of the market boundary,
it is now possible to continue the discussion about
systematic and specific risk in real estate investment. In
the last chapter, six risk variables for real estate
investment were identified; inflation, tax effects, investor
confidence, financing, leasing and market factors. In the
context of the national real estate market, all of these
factors can be seen to have both systematic and specific
components.
An increase in the overall U.S. inflation rate will
affect all regions equally. In that sense, inflation would
be characterized as systematic risk. It cannot be
diversified away by any combination of assets in the
domestic real estate market. At the same time, inflation in
a certain sector can affect regions of the country
differently, depending upon their degree of reliance on
inputs from the inflated sector. A prime example of this
was the energy crisis of the 1970's. The escalation in oil
prices created a boom in regions that could drill for oil
(Texas), and created a bust for regions who were most
heavily dependent on oil consumption (the Northeast). In
this sense, inflation that is driven by a particular sector
is a specific risk that can be diversified away.
A similar argument that inflation has both systematic and
specific components can be made with respect to product
types within or across regions. In the rising energy cost
example above, it is likely that within the Northeast region
the effect of this inflation would be greater for a multi-
family residential property than for an office property.
Multi-family residential properties are less able than other
property types to pass on increases in energy costs (tenants
are constrained by a total housing budget), and it follows
that their net income would be affected most by changes in
the cost of energy. The systematic component to this sector
inflation, would be the lowest common denominator cost
increase experienced by the various product types.
In the case of tax effects, the argument is much simpler.
Changes in the Federal Tax Code represent a systematic risk
to domestic U.S. real estate investors. Although tax
burdens can be shifted from one party to another, this is
not the same as diversifying tax effects away. State Tax
Code changes represent specific risk. By holding properties
in different states, the impact of a change in the income or
capital gains tax rate can be minimized. An investor whose
real estate holdings are all in one state is incurring a tax
risk that he is not being compensated for.
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Changes in investor confidence can also be seen to have
both systematic and specific components. Recall from the
last chapter that a multi-variate regression by Russell-
Zisler [22] on FRC data found that as investor confidence
erodes (as measured by the spread between the return on
corporate and U.S. Government Bonds), real estate returns
rise. In the context of this study investor confidence can
be characterized as a systematic risk. The effect of
confidence changes was nearly the same across all regions
and property types. Given this, it is not possible to
diversify the risk away.
Within real estate, however, investor confidence acts as
a specific risk. The bad press that a region or product
type may receive tends to create an overreaction by
investors. For example, the early part of 1990 has seen a
reluctance of investors to participate in new ventures in
the Northeast region. It has been suggested that this
withdrawal from the region may be in excess of what is
fundamentally warranted. Only time will tell for sure.
Conversely, in Houston in the 1970's and early 1980's the
level of investor confidence in the region resulted in a
development glut that continues to depress returns on those
investments.
While it has been argued that these risk variables
(inflation, tax effects, and investor confidence) have both
systematic and specific components, the systematic risk
component is dominant in each case. As discussed above, the
specific components of these risks can be diversified by
holding a portfolio across product and regional lines. The
three remaining risk variables (financing, leasing, and
market) are dominated by their specific components. To a
certain extent, these may also be diversified away by
holding a portfolio across product and regional lines. The
next chapter discusses these three risks in more detail,
and develops an approach to enhance the effectiveness of
portfolio diversification efforts, by using asset management
functions to the portfolio managers' advantage.
Early Diversification:
In the early days that preceded the participation of
institutional investors, real estate development and
investment was largely characterized by specialists. The
most specialized investors restricted their activities to
one product type in one region. When diversification did
occur, it usually took one of two forms. The easiest way to
diversify was to invest in more than one product type in a
familiar region. This strategy could achieve a certain
measure of diversification, while incurring a minimum
increase in overhead costs. A somewhat more difficult way
to diversify was to invest in familiar product type in
several different regions. Opening up new regional markets
required an upfront investment to learn and establish a
presence in the market.
As institutional investors entered the real estate
marketplace, seeking to diversify their holdings in the
securities markets, they sought to improve upon the
diversification strategies in practice at the time. The
desired end was to own a real estate portfolio that
approximated an index of the overall real estate market.
This notion was transferred from the stock market where
portfolios of thirty to forty stocks could, if chosen
correctly, approximately mirror the performance of the
Standard and Poor's 500 stock market index. This objective
was hampered by the lack of a market index for real estate,
and the lack of historical data from which to generate betas
or correlation coefficients.
Institutional investors responded to these constraints by
acquiring assets that seemed to be diversified. The new
real estate investors had sufficient resources to attempt
diversification across both region and product type. Rules
of thumb were used to set asset allocation targets, across
both regions and product types. Because these rules of
thumb were developed without any fundamental justification,
this practice has become known as naive diversification
(naive in that there is no statistical study to justify the
allocation targets).
The initial efforts to diversify across regional real
estate markets were not very effective. The dramatic
decline of real estate values in cities such as Denver,
Houston, and New Orleans, that accompanied the drop in oil
prices, caused investors to critically assess their
diversification strategies. New Orleans, classified as a
southern city, was intended to diversify exposure to Denver,
a western city. The then prevailing regional classification
scheme was obviously flawed.[20] As time went on, investors
were able to refine the strategies by using historical total
return data from their own portfolios.
Over the last few years, the body of literature
pertaining to locational and product type diversification
has been growing rapidly. Most articles consider product
type and location considerations separately. The next three
sections present a summary of the most recent of these
articles, followed by observations and recommendations.
Diversification by Product Type:
The first compelling evidence of diversification benefits
derived from real estate portfolios holding different
product types was provided by a 1987 study by Firstenberg,
Ross, and Zisler.[2] Using data from the Frank Russell
Company (FRC) Index, the authors developed an efficient
frontier, across five property types. The efficient
portfolio mixes are shown in Figure 3.1. The highest
returns are achieved by holding a portfolio heavily weighted
in hotel and office properties. This strategy, however,
exposes the investor to higher levels of systematic risk.
The lowest risk portfolios would contain mostly apartment,
industrial, and retail properties.
FIGURE 3.1 - Efficient Portfolio by Property Type
(Proportions, %)
Apart. Hotels Indust. Office Retail Mean Std. Dev.
4% 4% 92% 11.80% 2.10%
9 20 71 12.30 1.97
13 36 51 12.80 1.94
18 50 1% 31 13.30 2.01
23 61 3 13 13.80 2.18
30 61 9 14.30 2.43
41 2% 34 24 14.80 2.81
53 3 7 38 15.30 3.29
38 16 46 15.80 4.03
15 33 53 16.30 5.23
49 51 16.80 6.67
67 33 17.30 8.40
84 16 17.80 10.29
98 2 18.20 11.88
Source: Firstenberg, Zisler, and Ross [1987]
Subsequent studies have verified these findings. It is
interesting to note that a more recent study by Randall
Zisler [22], which excluded apartments and hotels, yielded a
somewhat different efficient mix. Zisler's study described
high return portfolios which were dominated by office and
retail. The lowest risk portfolios contained mostly R&D and
warehouse properties.
While most researchers agree that diversification across
product types reduces portfolio risk, some criticism has
been directed at investor's implementation of property type
diversification strategies. In their 1987 article,
Firstenberg, Ross, and Zisler (2] caution that often "within
a given city, the same economic forces that influence the
business demand for industrial and office space also affect
the demand of workers for residential space, customers'
demand for hotel room-nights, and the demand of retailers
who sell to the workers." A thorough analysis of inter-
industry and inter-occupational linkages is advocated.
In a 1989 article by Hopkins and Shulman (18], the
observation is made that institutional portfolios exhibit
significant deviation from an actual index of the real
estate market. The study estimates the market (defined to
be all commercial buildings constructed over the last twenty
years) to consist of 35% apartments, 30% offices, 18%
retail, 11% warehouses, and 6% hotels. This mix is
contrasted with the FRC index (as a proxy for institutional
holdings) which includes 4% apartments, 58% office, 22%
retail, 15% warehouses, and 2% hotels. This deviation
suggests an institutional bias that may reduce the
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effectiveness of their product-type diversification efforts.
Despite these limitations, it is apparent that
diversification across product-type, when properly executed,
can reduce portfolio risk. The most difficult obstacle that
needs to be overcome in devising an effective product type
diversification strategy is the absence of adequate data on
historical returns. This subject is addressed in more
detail in a later section of this chapter.
Diversification by Location:
A 1986 article by Hartzell, Heckman, and Miles [6]
reviewed the benefits derived from diversification by region
(East, West, South, and Midwest) and property type. Among
the findings cited in the article was that the "results
suggest that current industry practice represents little
more than naive diversification. Due to the low levels of
systematic risk, current distinctions by region and property
type make little sense in a world of costly diversification.
... more exacting categories [are needed]."
The call for more refined regional categories to better
reflect the economic factors influencing real estate returns
was answered in a 1987 article by Hartzell, Shulman, and
Wurtzebach [8]. The thrust of this article was to propose a
redefinition of regions that are "economically cohesive."
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The inspiration for the classification was a book by Joel
Garreau, The Nine Nations of North America. Drawing from
his experience as a newspaper reporter, Garreau divided the
country into nine distinct regions. Working along these
lines, Hartzell, Shulman, and Wurtzebach identified eight
economic regions; New England, Mid-Atlantic Corridor, Old
South, Industrial Midwest, Farm Belt, Mineral Extraction
Area, Southern California, and Northern California (Figure
3.2).
FIGURE 3.2 - Eight-Region Segmentation
Mineral Extraction
Farr Belt Industrial Midwest
Northern
California
Southern
California
,le
England
Mid-Atlantic
Corridor
Source: Salomon Brothers Inc, February 1988
The study provided economic profiles for each of the
regions. New England has an employment base in high-
technology and defense related production and business,
financial and education services. The region is
characterized as a net energy importer. The Mid-Atlantic
Corridor depends on international trade, government/defense
spending and financial and business services. This area is
also a net energy importer. The Old South has growing
manufacturing and office sectors, resulting from the
region's low production and living costs. The Industrial
Midwest is dominated by unionized mass production
industries; steel, automobiles, machinery, and farm
equipment. This region is a net energy importer. The Farm
Belt economy depends on the production and processing of
agricultural commodities. The Mineral Extraction Area
depends mostly on oil. Some cities in this area have seen
recent growth in services and high-technology production.
Southern California's economic activities include Far East
trade, defense production, and low wage manufacturing and
services. Northern California depends on trade, defense,
services, and lumber.
The regressions run using this regional classification
scheme gave rise to the following conclusion:
Regional diversification does matter for real estate
portfolios, in the sense that the eight-region
categorization produces lower correlation coefficients
than the traditional classification into four regions.
the traditional four-region analysis does not
capture the impact of regional diversification. This
study represents an attempt to move from mere
geographic diversification to a more economic base-
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oriented concept.
In a subsequent article, Wurtzebach [20] suggested that
the above study could be further improved with a more
refined analysis of the characteristics underlying regions.
Wurtzebach advocates two approaches to achieve this end.
Locations can be classified by analysis of relative
employment growth patterns, or by analysis of employment
composition (economic base). Both of these methods allow
locational classification at the metropolitan (SMSA) level,
as opposed to broad geographic regions.
The employment growth approach identifies five growth
categories; consistently higher growth (Atlanta and San
Francisco), recently higher growth (Oakland and
Jacksonville), recently lower growth (Houston and Miami),
consistently lower growth (Kansas City and Cleveland), and
cyclical growth (New York and Indianapolis). Back testing
these categories against the same data base as the Hartzell,
Shulman, and Wurtzebach study resulted in even lower
correlation coefficients, indicating superior performance.
The economic base approach proposes five broad categories
of employment composition; diversified (St. Louis and
Wilmington), energy (Houston, Tulsa), government (Washington
and San Antonio), manufacturing (Chicago and Anaheim), and
services (New York and San Francisco). The broad categories
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were intended to maintain statistical significance subject
to the size of the historical data base. Testing of this
method proved it to be more effective than the four-regions
approach, but less so than the eight-regions approach. One
advantage cited for the economic base approach is that it
"facilitates the translation of sectoral forecasting to
analysis of investment strategy."
In a 1990 study, S. Michael Giliberto [5] proposed an
economic location diversification scheme that builds upon
both the eight nation regional classification and the
employment growth approach. Giliberto argued that
employment growth is the best proxy of demand for real
estate. In any given regional market, employment growth can
be seen to have three components; a national effect, an
industry mix effect, and a regional effect. The first two
components represent systematic risk in the U.S. domestic
real estate market. The third component, the regional
effect, is specific risk within the real estate market. As
such, the variations in regional employment growth across
the country describe the opportunities for diversification
of location specific risk. The two tables below summarize
the results of Giliberto's regressions utilizing this
method.
FIGURE 3.3 - Correlations between Total Employment in the Eight Nations, 1976-89 (Annual Data)
NEG MAC IMW SOU FMB MEX NCA SCA
New England (NEG) 1.00
Mid-Atlantic (MAC) 0.88 1.00
Industrial Midwest (IMW) 0.73 0.79 1.00
Old South (SOU) 0.86 0.97 0.88 1.00
Farm Belt (FMB) 0.77 0.82 0.96 0.89 1.00
Mineral Extraction (MEX) 0.42 0.27 0.21 0.19 0.20 1.00
North. California (NCA) 0.76 0.73 0.84 0.81 0.86 0.41 1.00
South. California (SCA) 0.81 0.86 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.38 0.94 1.00
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Salomon Brothers, Inc.
FIGURE 3.4 -Correlations between Regional Employment Effects in the Eight Nations, 1976-89
(Annual Data)
NEG MAC IMW SOU FMB MEX NCA SCA
New England (NEG) 1.00
Mid-Atlantic (MAC) 0.64 1.00
Industrial Midwest (IMW) -0.45 -0.27 1.00
Old South (SOU) 0.65 0.81 0.05 1.00
Farm Belt (FMB) -0.22 -0.18 0.63 0.13 1.00
Mineral Extraction (MEX) 0.27 0.29 -0.73 -0.14 -0.64 1.00
North. California (NCA) -0.14 -0.44 -0.29 -0.35 -0.09 0.07 1.00
South. California (SCA) -0.07 -0.01 0.24 -0.18 0.52 1.00
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Salomon Brothers, Inc.
Figure 3.3 shows that all but the Mineral Extraction
Region experienced employment growth consistent with the
national growth rate. During this same time period, Figure
3.4 shows that the differences in the regional component of
employment growth across the country was quite significant.
"These values imply that diversification gains are possible
and support the regional diversification thesis. To
understand a potential source of diversification gains, real
estate investment managers can examine regional employment
changes that remain after the removal of national and
industry-mix effects."
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Giliberto's approach seems most promising. Several
observations should be noted at this time. The lack of good
data on real estate adds support for the method, since it
uses data that is readily available from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics. In this way, it avoids the major pitfall
inherent in most of the other quantitative based
diversification schemes. Furthermore, the general approach
allows the use of economic forecasts, so that investors do
not fall prey to the tenuous assumption that historical
trends are predictive of the future. In these two ways this
approach is superior to the other strategies considered so
far. However, it is important to understand that this
method only looks at half of the equation - real estate
demand. As Giliberto points out, "An important caveat is
that the employment data do not reflect the supply side, so
caution must be exercised in extrapolating correlations in
job changes to investment returns."
one suggestion that is beyond the scope of this paper, is
to use the three component approach (national, industry-mix,
and regional effects) to regress real estate return data for
the eight regions. The results of this exercise can then be
compared to Giliberto's numbers. It may be possible to
infer something about the supply elasticities for each of
the regions. Given sufficient data, this exercise might
best be conducted at the SMSA level, since supply effects
tend to be most related to local regulations and developer
capacities.
Diversification by Product Type and Location:
In a 1989 article, Susan Hudson-Wilson [10] advocated a
diversification approach that is something of a hybrid of
the property-type and location techniques discussed above.
Hudson-Wilson argues that it may be inappropriate to use the
same property type allocation for each region, and vice
versa. Instead, she proposes a simultaneous (as opposed to
sequential) approach. "Thus an asset class is defined as,
for example, Baltimore-Office, Baltimore-Apartment,
Baltimore-Retail, Baltimore-Industrial, San Francisco-
Office, San Francisco-Apartment, etc." After performing
statistical regressions according to these parameters,
groups of assets with shared attributes are clustered.
one criticism of this approach is that it amounts to
looking for answers without knowing what the questions are.
A problem arises when clusters are defined that don't seem
to make sense. What is the meaning of a high correlation
between apartments in San Bernadino and office buildings in
Boston? Without an explanation of the forces underlying the
behavior, it may be inappropriate to assign predictive
potential to the observed historical relationship.
Even if one were to put aside the above concern,
successful implementation of this intensive quantitative
method is hampered by data constraints. Only the largest
investors have enough historical data to attempt this kind
of approach. For those few investors with sufficient
resources, it seems that the best use of this detailed
approach is to suggest relationships to seek explanations
for. The result will be an improved understanding of causes
and effects in real estate, which can enhance an overall
diversification strategy. However, smaller scale investors
will need to implement strategies that are less
quantitatively demanding.
Data Constraints:
By now it is apparent that a common thread running
through the research is that the data currently available
severely limits the extent to which diversification can
occur. Many institutions do not have sufficient data in-
house to successfully implement anything beyond naive
diversification. These investors depend on outside data
sources to suggest allocation targets. This reliance on
outside data creates a problem for smaller firms. There is
very little outside data currently available, and what is
available isn't very good or very detailed.
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The FRC index is the oldest and most commonly used real
estate data source. It is a quarterly time series running
from 1978 to the present. The asset mix of the index by
product type and regional composition as of June 30, 1987 is
shown in the tables below.[17]
FIGURE 3.5 - Property Composition of FRC
(All dollars in Millions)
Property Property Percent Number of
Type Value by Value Properties
Office $ 5,212 47% 300
Retail 2,166 20 133
Industrial 3,080 28 521
Hotels 255 2 12
Apartments 343 3 29
Total $11,056 100% 995
Index
Percent
by Number
30%
13
52
1
3
100%
Source: Ross and Zisler [1987]
FIGURE 3.6 - Regional Composition of FRC
(All dollars in Millions)
Property Property Percent Number of
Type Value by Value Properties
East $ 2,420 22% 137
Midwest 1,584 14 208
South 2,635 24 307
West 4,417 40 343
Total $11,056 100% 995
Index
Percent
by Number
14%
21
31
35
100%
Source: Ross and Zisler [1987]
Zisler and Ross [17] caution that "there may be
systematic features of the FRC properties that affect the
pattern of returns. In particular, the decisions to buy and
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sell may not be representative of a value-weighted real
estate index. This notion of a bias to the index is
supported by the Hopkins and Shulman [18] study cited
earlier. The property type weighting of the FRC Index
differs substantially from a value weighted index of the
overall real estate market.
A further concern has been voiced by a number of
researchers who question the validity of the index return
data. In a 1988 article, Hartzell and Webb [9] reported
responses to a survey of over 100 major real estate
investors and researchers. "Only 18% of the respondents
said they believed that the FRC Index approximated the
actual volatility of real estate. The reason most often
cited for this anomaly is the smoothing caused by using
appraisals to estimate property appreciation. This belief
has stimulated interest in the development of a transaction
based real estate index. To date, however, no one has been
able to overcome the "noise" in the transaction data that is
derived from the heterogeneous nature of real estate. Price
variations between two properties will most likely be
dominated by differences in their respective leasehold
interests. The Frank Russell Companies recently abandoned
its attempt to develop a transaction data base, citing the
noise issue as the primary obstacle. A transaction database
sponsored by Standard and Poor's 500, the National Real
Estate Index, has not been well received by investors.
Despite the company's claim that the index has been
"normalized" to correct for differences in property
characteristics, the perception among investors is that this
database is less useful than the appraisal-based FRC
index.[14]
Recommendations:
In view of the information presented in this chapter, two
recommendations are in order. First, the economic location
approaches offer the most promising portfolio
diversification strategies for all real estate investors.
In particular, Giliberto's focus on regional variations in
employment growth appears to be the most appropriate
strategy for all but the largest investors, for three
reasons. First, it has an intuitive appeal lacking in the
other trend oriented approaches. Second, implementation of
an investment strategy incorporating this technique would
not be overly resource intensive. The data needed to run
the regressions is readily available. Third, this method
facilitates the possibility of a "forward" looking approach,
rather than relying solely on historical trend analysis.
Asset allocation decisions could be made with the use of
economic sector forecasts. As mentioned earlier, this
approach needs to be supplemented with some accounting for
the supply characteristics of the individual markets. If no
51
statistical technique can be devised to describe supply,
investors could still use Giliberto's demand description,
and supplement it with their own knowledge of local market
supply constraints.
The second recommendation is that investors would do well
to look beyond location and property-type diversification
for risk management opportunities. The "noise" cited in the
transaction data stems from factors that are internal to the
property. The magnitude of this variation, relative to
variation across external factors, suggests that significant
benefits can be derived from diversification across specific
risk factors that do not vary along location or product-type
lines. The asset management function that is inherent in
the real estate investment process offers an opportunity to
achieve this objective. Managing portfolio risk in this way
is covered in more detail in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR:
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT & SPECIFIC RISK
Chapter Summary: While location and
property-type variations have been shown to
offer significant opportunities for portfolio
diversification, real estate investors should
also look to diversify specific risks that
are not addressed by these two approaches.
One tool to accomplish this task is a matrix
that ranks several categories of specific
risk for each property, and attempts to co-
ordinate decision-making between asset
management and portfolio management.
In Chapter Two, six factors comprising risk in real
estate investment were identified; inflation, tax effects,
investor confidence, financing, leasing, and market factors.
The first three of these were said to represent systematic
risk within the U.S. domestic real estate markets. The
remaining factors were characterized as being primarily
specific risk. In chapter three, all of the risks were
discussed in more detail, and techniques were presented for
diversification of a portion of the specific risks
identified.
Investors who are able to own properties in several
different locations are able to diversify the specific risk
component of tax effects, investor confidence, and market
factors. Diversification across locations is most effective
for specific risk due to market factors. Product-type
diversification strategies address portions of the specific
risk arising from leasing and market factors.
From this discussion it is clear that while the
diversification strategies presented in chapter three may be
effective in dealing with some of the specific risk in real
estate investment, other specific risks are ignored.
Furthermore, investors who do not have a significant
presence in the national or multi-product real estate market
are unable to exploit the risk reduction opportunities
presented by location and product-type diversification
strategies. For these two reasons, it appears that an
additional investment tool is needed to facilitate portfolio
risk reduction supplementary to, or in lieu of location and
product-type diversification. One possible tool to
accomplish this end is presented below, in a case study of
Perini Investment Properties, and their Risk Evaluation
Matrix. Following the case study is a critical review of
the matrix.
THE CASE
For the past four years, Perini Investment Properties, a
Massachusetts based real estate investment company has been
using a risk management technique that its president had
helped to develop. The centerpiece of this strategy was the
Portfolio Risk Evaluation Matrix (Figure 4.2). The purpose
of the matrix was to describe the level of risk in the
portfolio broken down by location, product-type, and risk
component. This information was then used to help set
acquisition targets, by property-type and market. In
addition, the matrix could be used to suggest ideal criteria
for tenant selection, and finance and lease structure. This
analysis of the individual components of property-specific
risk was used as a planning tool for future portfolio-level
decisions.
Since the matrix was first introduced, PIP's portfolio
had reduced its concentration in the California market, and
in the office property-type. While it is difficult to
assess the extent to which the Risk Evaluation Matrix
contributed to this improved diversification, the president
was convinced that it had facilitated the process, at the
very least. As he put it:
The matrix provides a clear rationale for allocation of
capital and people resources in each area and product
type. This reduces the time required to explain to
area managers and get them to buy into the process.
Overall, he felt that the Risk Evaluation Matrix satisfied
seventy to eighty percent of Perini's risk management needs.
Perini Investment Properties:
Perini Investment Properties was started in 1984 as a
spin-off of Perini Corporation, to own, manage, and develop
a variety of income properties for the purpose of generating
cash flow and long-term asset appreciation. A primary
motivation for the company's creation was to break out the
cash-flow oriented real estate properties in order to
highlight their cash flow and asset appreciation benefits.
Standard GAAP accounting practice treats real estate as a
depreciable asset. In addition, publicly traded companies
are valued on an earnings per share basis, which fails to
reflect the tax benefits afforded real estate investors. By
spinning PIP off from Perini Corporation as a separate,
publicly traded real estate investment company, it was hoped
that equity investors would be less inclined to discount the
appreciation and tax benefits inherent in real estate.
Towards this end, PIP's annual reports included both income
and cash flow statements, and balance sheets on a historical
cost basis and a current value basis. The company maintains
that "cash flow and net current value are the most relevant
measures of the Company's performance."
PIP's real estate holdings were concentrated in five
markets: Massachusetts, Florida, Northern California,
Arizona, and Georgia. One reason for selecting these
particular markets is that they were locations that Perini
Land and Development Company (a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Perini Corporation) had already established a presence in.
This allowed PIP to share resources with PL&D, and lower its
56
start-up and search costs. In addition to diversification
across markets, Perini also invested in a variety of
investment property-types: Apartment, Retail, Office,
Mixed-Use, Office/Industrial, and Hotel.
In 1984, the portfolio contained assets with a market
value of $120.5 million. Ninety-two percent of this was in
Northern California, and the remaining eight percent was in
Massachusetts. The product mix was sixty-two percent
offices, thirty percent apartments, and eight percent
industrial properties. At the end of 1989, the portfolio
had grown in size to $300.6 million. The relative weighting
by region was: California 65%; Arizona 16%; Florida 12%;
and Massachusetts 6%. The composition by property-type was:
Apartments 32%; Industrial/R&D 13%; Office 40%; Retail 11%;
and Hotel 5% (Figure 4.1). PIP intended to continue making
acquisitions at the rate of $50-$60 million per year. In
addition, the company wanted to use these acquisitions to
further diversify its portfolio.
In the company's last strategic planning meeting, the
prospects for each of the narkets and product-types were
discussed. California looked good, Arizona and
Massachusetts did not look good, and Florida and Georgia
were mixed. Similarly, residential and industrial looked
good, office looked poor, and retail and hotel were mixed.
FIGURE 4.1 - PIP Portfolio
At December 31. 1989
Appraised %
Project Dae Area/' Current Value (In Econoi
'Type Acq'd Units % Leased Thousands) Interest
cam
s maise
Golden Gateway Center Apartments/Commercial 5/84 1.254 97% $150.600 66.3%
Rinco - Mixed-Use 12/85 2.8%
Aparutents 320 in Lease-Up
Retail 78-000 s.f. In Lease-Up
Offce 418.000 s.f. In Lease-Up
MestbalVIew
Maunain Bay Plaza Office 12/84 153.000 s.f. 91% $ 28.500 100%
South Bay Office Tower Office 12/85 153.000 s.f. 81% S 22.100 92.25%
WaInut Creek Executiw Park Office Park 12/88 431.000 s.f. 84% S 39.000 100%
Vb1ey North Business Park Comnercial/Industrial 9/85 200.000 s.f. 87% S 7.900 95.5%
Soutiwet Vilages Apartnents 12185 40%
Phase 176 92% 5 1.560
Phase II 240 92%
Phase iI 194 Under Development
Fairmount Square Office 10188 36.000 s.f. 100% S 5.000 100%
am"
Hayden Square Mixed-Use 12/86 S 16.800 79.9%
Office 61.000 s.f. 100%
RetaiuCommercial 45.000 s.f. 89%
lh1001
Radisson Suite Hotel Hotel 1/85 306 suites 77%q'2 S 18.000 100%
North Tucson Business Center Office/lndustrial 3/88 91.000 s.f. 100% S 5.700 100r
-la
tasten
Easton Industrial Park Commercial/Industrial 5/84 110.000 s.f. 91% S 6.400 100
Needhain
410 First Avenue Commercialllndustriul In S , S 5.700 t;
Dencerd
Comtech Park CommercialR&D 12/85 107.000 .f. 209 S 9.700 94Q
FLORID
-een pawon,Pomp=@ ash
Boca-Pompano Properties Commercial/Industrial 2187 252.000 S.f. 687 S 10.500 94.59
Dynamic Control Office Park Office 9/87 93.000 S.f. 100q S 9.300 93.51
Frt Laderdale
1200 Weston Road - Office 6/18 15.0().f. 100% S 2.600 100'
West PalB Beach
Village Connons Shopping Ccnter Shopping Center 4/98 170.0(X) -.1. S7 S 20.750 100
In setting acquisition targets, PIP took this information
into consideration, together with the information provided
by the matrix about risk levels across the portfolio.
The Risk Evaluation Matrix:
In 1986, the CEO was looking to develop a tool to help
manage risk in Perini's portfolio. A literature survey on
the subject of diversification failed to uncover any
existing dependable tools for portfolio management. Working
with a consultant, the Risk Evaluation Matrix was developed
(Figure 4.2). The purpose of the matrix was to assess and
quantify real estate investment risk. The matrix evaluates
five separate elements that contribute to overall real
estate risk. Each of the five elements is assigned a risk
factor weight from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk). Based on
these factors a mean and "value weighted" mean risk for the
portfolio were calculated. The first element the matrix
considered was capital exposure. The purpose of this factor
was to assess the company's exposure to additional
investment and/or costs to maintain or re-fit a property.
For most of the established operating properties, this
factor warranted a low risk rating. For most new
properties, where costs are uncertain and financing
structure is not yet set, this category elicits a high risk
rating. A good example is Rincon Center, a newly developed
mixed-use office, retail and apartment building located on
FIGURE 4.2 - PIP Risk Evaluation Matriz
State Property / Weights:
Current
Value
Capital
Investment
Capital Lsg.
Exposure Risk
Mkt. Oper. Valuation
Risk Risk Risk
CA Mountain Bay Plaza $28,500 2 3 4 2 3
South Bay Office Tower 20,387 2 4 4 2 3
Walnut Creek Exec. Park 39,000 3 3 2 2 6
Rincon Center 37,620 5 3 2 3 2
Golden Gateway Center 99,848 1 1 1 2 1
sub-total
Value Weighted Means
AZ Valley North Bus. Pk.
Hayden Square
Alphagraphics
Fairmont Square
Radisson Hotel
Southwest Villages
sub-total
Value Weighted Means
FL Boca/Pompano Properties
Dynamic Control Office Pk.
Weston Building
Village Commons Shop. Ctr.
sub-total
Value Weighted Means
MA Easton Industrial Park
410 First Ave.
Comtech Park
sub-total
Value Weighted Means
$225,355 13 14 13 11 15
2.23 2.20 1.99 2.17 2.47
$7,545
13,423
5,700
5,000
18,000
7,155
3 . 3
$56,823 12 19 21
1.83 3.04 3.26
10
1.77
22
3.66
$9,713 2 3 3 1 3
8,463 1 2 3 1 3
2,600 1 1 1 1 3
20,750 4 4 4 3 2
$41,526 8 10 11 6 11
2.73 3.17 3.37 2.00 2.50
$6,400 1 2 3 1 2
5,700 1 1 1 1 2
9,700 5 5 5 3 5
$21,800 7 8 9 5 9
2.78 3.07 3.37 1.89 3.33
Total $345,504 40 51 54 32 57
Means
Value Weighted Means
2.22 2.83 3.00 1.78 3.17
2.26 2.51 2.45 2.06 2.72
Portfolio Target: Value weighted Risk Factor - 3.0
the edge of San Francisco's financial district. The
property experienced a certain amount of construction delay
and cost overruns. As the building approaches full
occupancy, the risk rating will move lower. Older
properties with major lease turns expected near-term will
also face high capital exposure risk. This is especially
true in markets with high vacancy rate and tenant
concessions.
The second element included in the matrix was leasing
risk. This was defined as the sensitivity of rents to
market forces. Two factors fed this component of risk.
First was the relationship between average rents for the
property and average rents for the market. Second was the
impact of impending lease rolls. Staggered lease turns, and
a balanced mix of lease terms contribute to a low risk
ranking in this category. In contrast, a property that
benefited from rents that were significantly above market
rents, but had a major tenant's lease expiring in a year,
would be subject to a high level of leasing risk.
The third element in the matrix was market risk. For the
purpose of the matrix this was defined as the acceptability
of the product in the marketplace. Forces impacting this
risk component include prevailing vacancy rates, lease
default rates, and lease concessions. In practice, the
distinction between leasing risk and market risk was not
always clear. The original intent was for this category to
be more property specific than leasing risk. In that sense,
market risk reflected the attractiveness of Perini's
property relative to other properties in the market.
The fourth element in the matrix was operating risk.
This was defined as the company's ability to control the
property's cost of operations. The forces driving this risk
were similar to capital exposure. In new properties, the
baseline costs are not known. This risk was typically high
for a new property, but dropped as the property matured.
The onset of high inflation in conjunction with a tough
leasing environment might cause this risk to increase for
established properties. On balance, it was felt that this
risk was not as important as most of the others. That is,
it did not tend to have a significant effect on either
income or appreciation returns.
The fifth element in the matrix was valuation risk. The
working definition for this category was risk of changes in
perception of value of the income stream. To a certain
extent, this risk was driven by the other four elements. It
also picked up influences not included in the other four
categories. One recent example of an external factor was
the change in appraiser's behavior, particularly in certain
markets. A change from a liberal to a conservative
appraisal could have a major impact on appreciation returns,
independent of any of the other risk elements. Similarly,
the valuation risk category includes systematic influences
such as changes in cap rates resulting from capital market
changes which may be independent of property markets.
In putting the matrix together, it was clear that not all
of the risk categories were equally important. To
compensate for this inequity, a weighting scheme was
included. Capital exposure was deemed least important and
given a weight of one. Leasing Risk, Market Risk, and
Operating Risk were all judged to be equally important and
given a weight of two. Finally, valuation risk was
determined to be the most important element and given a
weight of three.
Using the Matrix:
The matrix was viewed as a conceptual tool by most of
PIP's executives. It was reassessed a couple of times a
year, and used to set targets. To date, the matrix had been
used exclusively for acquisitions. The target level of risk
for the overall portfolio was 3.0. As of the 1989 Planning
Session, the portfolio's risk level fell below this target
at 2.45 (Figure 4.3). This suggested that the overall
portfolio should seek to incur slightly more risk in pursuit
of higher returns. In addition to this overall risk
assessment, the levels of risk elements, markets, and
product-types were also important to consider.
In 1989, the risk levels by market were: California
2.24; Arizona 2.89; Florida 2.73; and Massachusetts 2.94.
From these numbers, investment criteria for each of the
markets was determined. Deals in Massachusetts should be
fairly low risk. At the other end of the spectrum, the
California portfolio allowed acquisitions with significantly
higher levels of risk. A moderate risk level was desired
for acquisitions in Florida and Arizona.
The risk levels by product-type were: office 2.52;
residential 1.59; industrial 1.94; retail 2.92; hotel 2.90.
Using this information, it was decided that any hotel or
retail acquisitions would only be considered if they were
deemed to be low risk. Higher risk acquisitions were
considered appropriate for residential and industrial
properties. In the case of offices, the poor market
conditions for the product-type warranted a low risk
approach, independent of the matrix rating.
Finally, the matrix also provided insight to levels of
risk by its various components. These were: Capital
Exposure 2.26; Leasing Risk 2.51; Market Risk 2.45;
FIGURE 4.3 - PIP Portfolio Risk Levels
3
3.5
1.5
0.5
0-
Cap.Ex p.
L sg.Rsk.
Mki.Rsk.
Op~d .Rsk.Wal.Rsk.
To tal H1l<.
.1It .%
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1.88
3.04
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2.3
2.36
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(p.isk.
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Val.Rsk.
Li
Li
Mkt.Rsk.
Total Rsk.
Operating Risk 2.06; and Valuation Risk 2.72. In this case,
the relatively high valuation risk was the source of some
concern, while the low risk levels for operating risk and
capital exposure suggested that it was possible to structure
deals that were more aggressive in these two areas.
In theory, the matrix could be used for portfolio
management issues that extended beyond acquisitions. One
such example would be to suggest the most appropriate lease
structure (term, index for escalation clause, etc.) for new
tenants. In practice, there were several obstacles to
achieving this end. In the leasing example, market
conditions will often dictate to what extent property owners
obtain their desired lease structure, and at what cost.
Another impediment to overcome would be resistance from
personnel within the organization. Unless area and asset
managers could be convinced of the value of this kind of
intervention, they were not likely to buy into it. To the
people in the field, real estate investment was "the good
deals", not the acquisition targets. To these people asset
management was "tenant retention", and this started with
established relationships that grew out of a hands-on
approach.
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The Internal Critique:
The company's CFO was the designated "custodian of the
matrix". He served as the objective coordinator of the
subjective ranking process. One concern he had voiced was
not really being clear about what the overall risk target
for the portfolio should be. The 3.0 target didn't directly
relate to anything tangible and, in that sense, the matrix
lacked a pragmatic benchmark. At the same time, the CFO was
quite positive about the matrix's usefulness for focusing
management's attention on particular issues, projects, and
markets. If a project were listed in the matrix with a five
rank for leasing risk, the portfolio manager would maintain
close contact with asset management regarding the lease.
The area managers gave the matrix mixed reviews. Their
enthusiasm for the tool did not quite match that of PIP's
president. It was not clear whether or not this had been or
would be a problem. There were no serious complaints about
the matrix. No one cited it as an impediment to doing their
jobs. At the same time, no one credited it with making
their jobs any easier. In particular, where tough market
conditions prevail, good deals are often few and far
between. In this situation, the targets set by the matrix
loose their relevance. At least one of the regional
managers had, however, indicated that it was worthwhile
having a tangible representation of senior management's
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decision-making process.
There was some sentiment in the field that the area
managers' market expertise was more important than the
information in the matrix. Beyond this, some concern had
been voiced that the matrix could sometimes be misleading.
A product-type that is high risk in one location, may be low
risk elsewhere. Despite these reservations, there was a
general consensus that as the portfolio increases in size,
the value of the matrix as a tool was likely to increase.
THE CASE ANALYSIS
In reviewing the merits of the Perini Investment
Properties' Risk Evaluation Matrix as a risk reduction tool,
two issues must be addressed. First, How useful is the
general approach that employs a matrix to rank specific risk
categories in a portfolio context? Second, How successful
is this particular matrix, with its five categories of risk,
in fulfilling the potential for risk reduction offered by a
matrix approach.
The general approach of using a matrix to evaluate
portfolio risk appears to have some merit. At the very
least, it serves as a useful communication tool, within a
real estate investment organization. In this way, the
tension inherent between top-down portfolio decision-making
and bottom-up deal generation is somewhat abated. Beyond
this, it may be inappropriate to label the matrix as a
diversification technique in the MPT sense. The lack of a
quantitative foundation defies any attempt to generate an
"efficient frontier" with which diversification could take
place. Instead, the matrix allows for a balancing of the
portfolio across categories of specific risk, albeit in a
somewhat naive form. This lack of statistical backup
warrants the matrix a classification as a portfolio
management tool, rather than an MPT diversification
strategy. However, the risk evaluation matrix is useful,
independent of its classification, as a tool for managing a
portfolio's risk exposure. To maximize the effectiveness of
the tool, investors should use the matrix to coordinate
their asset management decisions with their portfolio
management objectives.
The second issue to be addressed in the analysis, the
effectiveness of PIP's matrix strategy in particular, is
somewhat more involved, and is considered in three parts.
The first part is to determine whether or not the
information provided by the matrix could be further
exploited to more fully manage portfolio risk on an on-going
basis. In order to accomplish this, the matrix information
would need to permeate more decisions than just the
acquisition ones. Under the current strategy, rebalancing
of the risk levels in the portfolio is only accomplished via
new acquisitions. As the portfolio grows, it will become
increasingly difficult to achieve the desired balance,
unless other asset management functions are also used.
Leasing, financing, and dispositions all seem like areas in
which the matrix information could be useful, and which
could be used to rebalance the portfolio over time. Of
these, leasing and refinancing are probably the most
practical, and cost effective techniques to be used for this
purpose on an ongoing basis. It is important to note,
however, that with the PIP portfolio valued at $300 million,
and growing at $50-60 million per year, it is possible that
risk rebalancing can be fully accomplished by using only
acquisitions. This approach will only need to be
supplemented if the rate of growth in the portfolio
significantly decreased. Under current conditions, PIP
would probably not benefit enough from a more intensified
"micro" management effort to offset the added costs
incurred.
The second part of the analysis is to determine if
opportunities exist to supplement or enhance the Risk
Evaluation Matrix in order to deal with risk characteristics
not reflected in the current strategy. There is nothing in
the matrix to describe market cycles that might be specific
to each area. If contrary market cycles could be identified
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from among Perini's five areas, the effectiveness of their
diversification efforts could be improved. In order to
check on this, correlation coefficients for market vs.
market (Figure 4.4), and product-type vs. product-type have
been calculated. one serious constraint to drawing
conclusions from these results is that the sample size is
quite small. In view of the implications of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act, and significant structural shifts in the
portfolio, the correlations were calculated using only the
data from 1987 on. One observation that can be made is that
these small-sample correlation coefficients show how the
performance of an actual portfolio can differ markedly from
general expectations about regional markets and product
types. These coefficients do, in fact, show diversification
effects (or lack thereof) which are contrary to the
expectations based on large sample study (e.g. FRC Index).
This finding is reinforced by a recent survey of
institutional real estate investors, conducted by Tate
Taylor and Marc Louargand, which found that only 36% of
respondents thought that the FRC Index matched the actual
volatility of their own portfolios.
The third part of this analysis attempts to quantify the
effectiveness of the Risk Evaluation Matrix as a tool for
portfolio diversification. In order to accomplish this,
correlation coeffients were calculated for income
FIGURE 4.4 - PIP Correlation Coefficients (1987-1989)
Market vs. Market:
Arizona
Massachusetts
California
0.20
1.00
Product vs. Product:
Residential Office Industrial
Office
Industrial
Hotel
Income vs. Value - by Market:
California
Arizona
Florida
Massachusetts
Income vs. Value - by Product:
Residential
Office
Industrial
Hotel
Arizona
0.21
-0.67
0.85
-0.85
-0.96
0.18 -0.45
-0.59
-0.02
-0.13
0.98
-0.94
-0.18
0.94
0.97
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return vs. appreciation return for each market and product-
type (Figure 4.4). The intent here was to compare these
results to the risk ratings for the areas and product-types
to determine if the matrix accurately reported the relative
volatility of income vs. appreciation returns. This attempt
was again hampered by the small sample size. Looking at the
bottom of Figure 4.4, with a correlation coefficient of
0.98, it can be inferred that the Massachusetts should have
a Valuation Risk Ranking approximately equal to the ranking
on all its other risk categories. This would mean that
changes in valuation for the region tend to be consistent
with changes in the income stream. The same argument can be
made for industrial and hotel properties, which have
coefficients of 0.94 and 0.97 respectively. Meanwhile, the
regions of California, Arizona, and Florida, and the
property-types of residential and office, all experienced
valuation movements that were not driven by changes in
income. This situation would suggest that the Valuation
Risk Ranking in these cases should be higher than the
category's average risk ranking. It is important to restate
that the sample size is very small (three years of data) and
these results may change significantly over time.
Finally, the performance history of the portfolio
(Figures 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7) has been examined. one asset
that stands out (not shown explicitly in the Figures)
FIGURE 4.5 - PIP Income Return Relationships
1986 1987 1988 1989
California - Arizona Florida ----- Mass.
FIGURE 4.6 - PIP Appreciation Return Relationships
1987 1988
-- Arizona
1986 1989
----- Mass. -- ZeroFlorida---- Califor nia
FIGURE 4.7 - PIP Total Return Relationships
L
1986 1987 1988 1989
- California
---- Mass.
- Arizona
- Zero
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-e$- Portfolio
is the Valley North Business Park property in Arizona, which
had taken a $5.3 million devaluation at the end of 1989.
Prior to this time, Valley North had been a dependable cash
flow producer for the portfolio. The reason for the
devaluation was the impending lease expiration, in 1990, of
a tenant that occupied 60% of the space, in conjunction with
the soft leasing market prevailing in the area. Perini
expected that the tenant would renew the lease, and if that
had happened, the property would have remained "insulated"
from the market.
Looking back at the decision history of the Risk
Evaluation Matrix showed that the matrix failed to reflect
this impending devaluation until 1988. This did not seem
consistent with the three year time horizon that the matrix
was intended to have. Furthermore, it wasn't clear, even in
retrospect, that the matrix rating would have picked up the
risk any earlier. That is, PIP perceived the long-term
relationship with the tenant to effectively mitigate the
risk of the lease turn, and the soft leasing market. The
central question here was whether or not it was proper to
reflect risk "mitigation" in the matrix. It seems that the
answer to this question should be no. Risk is, by
definition, uncertainty. Under this definition, it is
inappropriate to deny the existence of risk that is
"mitigated" by anything short of a signed contract (and even
then, there is the risk of default on the contract).
Another issue raised by the Valley North devaluation was
that the weighting of the risk elements in the matrix might
not be correct. It seems that a reduction in asset value of
this magnitude dwarfs return fluctuations resulting from any
of the other risk elements. In this sense, it would be
appropriate for the valuation risk element to have a
weighing factor of four or five, instead three.
Perhaps the most interesting question to come out of the
Valley North situation, was: What is the definition of risk
for the purpose of the matrix? Is risk downside exposure,
or variability in returns? One might expect the
appreciation risk ranking to drop after the property was
devalued. Dropping the ranking would reflect the diminished
downside valuation exposure to the property. The CFO felt
quite strongly, however, that the five ranking should stay
with the property. Under this line of reasoning, the high
valuation risk reflects a potential upside revaluation at
some time into the future. In this particular case, the
limited information available is insufficient to derive a
hard and fast rule. It is most important that the matrix
administrator maintain consistency across the board, and
that his methods are understood by those who read the
matrix. Beyond this it seems that if the likelihood of a
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rebound in the property's valuation is better than one in a
hundred, then it is o.k. to leave the risk ranking high.
However, if the devaluation occurred as the result of a one-
time structural shift (i.e. the property went from being
used as office space to warehouse space) then the risk
rating should drop to reflect the likelihood of future
stability in the property's value.
In total, it appears that PIP's Risk Evaluation Matrix is
a useful tool for managing specific risk that is not
addressed by location and product-type diversification
strategies. In addition, the matrix facilitates
coordination of asset and portfolio management efforts to
achieve diversification. Other companies interested in
employing a matrix approach would be best served to use
PIP's setup as a starting point. The five risk categories
may be added to or changed to improve the fit between the
matrix and the company. In addition, the weighting scheme
may be altered to reflect eccentricities of a given
company's portfolio. For example, a portfolio that is
entirely invested in a single metropolitan market should
look at weighing leasing, and appreciation more heavily than
in PIP's case. The important point here is that this
general approach of using as matrix to evaluate risk across
an investment portfolio can be an important tool. At the
same time, characteristics unique to each portfolio may
warrant some custom tailoring of the general approach.
CHAPTER FIVE:
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
As we move into the 1990's, some trends are clearly
evident. Institutional investors have emerged as major
players in the domestic United States real estate market,
and will continue to have a strong presence throughout the
decade. It is also apparent that these new real estate
investors have changed the way real estate investment is
done, by introducing Modern Portfolio Theory concepts to
real estate. The real estate investment roller coaster ride
that has occurred since the mid-1970's has made it clear to
even the old guard that diversification across regions and
property-types is essential for long term survival in the
marketplace.[14]
Much has been written over the last few years concerning
diversification strategies for real estate investment. The
most promising of these is the recent article cited in this
paper by S.M. Giliberto [5] on the use of regional
employment growth variations to diversify across regions.
As noted this method does a good job of defining
diversification opportunities on the demand side of the
equation. Additional research will need to be conducted to
account for supply influences in order for this method to be
complete. A quantitative study could be conducted to
outline probable supply responses for each of the 97 MSA's
in Giliberto's study. Otherwise, individual investors could
rely on their market knowledge to predict supply effects for
the locations they invest in.
While this approach has much to offer, its sophistication
makes it most appropriate for very large portfolios.
Investors with limited portfolios will need a supplement or
substitute, to address specific risk forces that are unique
to their holdings. This thesis has shown that by
coordinating asset management decisions with portfolio level
objectives, real estate investors can enhance their specific
risk management efforts. Towards this end, regional
diversification should be supplemented by portfolio
management techniques designed to monitor and manipulate
other categories of specific risk. One tool to accomplish
this task is the Risk Evaluation Matrix, presented in
Chapter Four. The matrix ranks several categories of
specific risk for each property and facilitates coordination
of decision-making between asset and portfolio management.
In so doing, it offers portfolio managers an important tool
for managing risk and communicating decisions to affected
parties within an organization.
Finally, local market knowledge, the traditional focus of
real estate investment decisions, will continue to play a
major role in decision making. It is important that the
front-line personnel understand the portfolio implications
of the decisions that they are called upon to make in the
field. The Risk Evaluation Matrix helps to accomplish this
end.
The best real estate investment strategies will have
elements of the three processes listed above; portfolio
diversification, portfolio management, and individual deal
analysis. The relative importance of each of these will be
up to the individual decision makers. As regional real
estate markets continue to cycle, there is a strong
likelihood that the balance between these three disciplines
will continue to favor a portfolio view.
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